

NTP Security Algorithms

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
Sir John Tenniel; *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, Lewis Carroll

Symmetric key and public key cryptography




- Public key cryptography
 - Encryption/decryption algorithms are relatively slow with highly variable running times depending on key and data
 - All keys are random; private keys are never divulged
 - Certificates reliably bind server identification and public key
 - Server identification established by challenge/response protocol
 - Well suited to multicast paradigm
- Symmetric key cryptography
 - Encryption/decryption algorithms are relatively fast with constant running times independent of key and data
 - Fixed private keys must be distributed in advance
 - Key agreement (Diffie-Hellman) is required for private random keys
 - Per-association state must be maintained for all clients
 - Not well suited to multicast paradigm

Message propagation time budget




- We want T_3 and T_4 timestamps for accurate network calibration
 - If output wait is small, T_{3a} is good approximation to T_3
 - T_{3a} can't be included in message after cryptosum is calculated, but can be sent in next message; use T_{3b} as best approximation to T_3
 - T_4 captured by most network drivers at interrupt time; if not, use T_{4a} as best approximation to T_4
- Largest error is usually output cryptosum
 - Private-key algorithms (MD5, DES-CBC) running times range from 10 μ s to 1 ms, depending on architecture, but can be predicted fairly well
 - Public-key algorithms (RSA) running times range up to 100 ms, depending on architecture, but are highly variable and depend on message content

MD5 message digest computations



- Measured times to construct 128-bit hash of 48-octet NTP header using MD5 algorithm in RSAREF

MD5/RSA digital signature computations



- Measured times (s) to construct digital signature using RSAREF
- Message authentication code constructed from 48-octet NTP header hashed with MD5, then encrypted with RSA 512-bit private key

Certificates




- A private/public key pair and self signed host certificate are required for each host.
 - Certificates are in X509 version 3 format valid for one year.
 - The serial number is the NTP seconds of generation to insure uniqueness.
- Extension fields are used to convey identity parameters and whether the certificate is private or trusted.
 - The required Basic Constraints field contains the string “critical,CA:TRUE”, indicating the host can act as a certificate authority.
 - The required Key Usage field contains the string “digitalSignature,keyCertSign”, indicating the certificate is valid for digital signatures and to sign other certificates.
 - The optional Extended Key Usage field contains the string “private” indicating a private certificate (PC identity scheme) or the string “trustRoot” indicating a trusted certificate. By definition, private certificates are trusted.
 - The optional Subject Key Identifier field contains the public key for the GQ identity scheme.

Signature operations




- Public keys, certificates and leapseconds files can be read from local files or sent over the net using the Autokey protocol.
- Cryptographic values are signed only when the host is synchronized.
 - Filestamps record the NTP seconds when the file was created. These are proventic data and provide a reliable total ordering of creation epoches.
 - Timestamps record the NTP seconds when the data were last signed. These are proventic data only when the sender is synchronized and provide only a partial ordering of signing epoches.
- Cryptographic values derived from files and received over the net are signed only when they are created or changed and in addition at refresh intervals of about one day.
- Autokey values are signed when the key list is regenerated, about once per hour.
- Cookie values are signed when sent.
- Identity values are signed when sent.

Identification exchange




- This is a challenge-response scheme
 - Client Alice and server Bob share a common set of public parameters and a private group key b .
 - Alice rolls random nonce r and sends to Bob.
 - Bob rolls random nonce k , computes a one-way function $f(r, k, b)$ and sends to Alice.
 - Alice computes some function $g(f, b)$ to verify that Bob knows b .
- The signature prevents message modification and binds the response to Bob's private key.
- An interceptor can see the challenge and response, but cannot determine k or b or how to construct a response acceptable to Alice.

Private certificate (PC) identity scheme




- TA generates a certificate marked private and transmits it by secure means to all servers and clients.
- The certificate is never divulged outside the group and never presented for signature.
- An identity exchange is not necessary.
- Refreshing certificates is a major problem

Trusted certificate (TC) identity scheme



- Each certificate is signed by the issuer, which is one step closer on the trail to the trusted host (TH).
- The trusted host certificate is self-signed and self-validated.
- This scheme is vulnerable to a middleman masquerade, unless an identity scheme is used.
- A trusted authority (TA) generates the group key (if used) which has the same name as the TH subject name.

Schnorr (IFF) identity scheme




- TA generates the IFF parameters and keys and transmits them by secure means to all servers and clients.
- Only the server needs the group key; the client key derived from it is public.
- IFF identity exchange is used to verify group membership.

Schnorr (IFF) identification scheme operations



- Schnorr (IFF) scheme is based on DSA principles.
 - Public parameters include 512-bit prime p , 160-bit prime q that divides $p - 1$ and generator g of p such that $g^q = 1 \pmod p$.
 - TA rolls private random group key b and distributes to all servers in the group using secure means.
 - TA computes public $v = g^{q-b} \pmod p$ and distributes to all clients in the group using insecure means.
 - Client Alice rolls random nonce r ($0 < r < q$) and sends to server Bob.
 - Bob rolls random nonce k ($0 < k < q$), computes $y = k + br \pmod q$ and $x = g^k \pmod p$, then sends $(y, \text{hash}(x))$ to Alice.
 - Alice computes $g^y v^r \pmod p$ (which is $g^k \pmod p$ without revealing k), then verifies $\text{hash}(g^k)$ matches $\text{hash}(x)$.
- If the parameters or group key are changed, all group members must be updated.

Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) scheme



- TA generates the GQ parameters and keys and transmits them by secure means to servers and clients.
- Server generates a GQ private/public key pair and certificate with the public key in an extension field.
- Client uses the public key in the certificate as the client key.
- GQ identity exchange is used to verify group membership.

Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) identity scheme operations



- Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) scheme is based on RSA principles.
 - Public parameters include 512-bit modulus n a product of two large primes p and q .
 - TA rolls private random group key b and distributes to all group members using secure means.
 - Each group member rolls random private nonce u ($0 < u < n$) and computes public $v = (u^{-1})^b \bmod n$, then saves both for future reference. The v is conveyed in an extension field of the member's public certificate.
 - Alice rolls random nonce r ($0 < r < q$) and sends to Bob.
 - Bob rolls random nonce k and computes $y = ku^r \bmod n$ and $x = k^b \bmod n$, then sends $(y, \text{hash}(x))$ to Alice.
 - Alice computes $y^b v^r \bmod n$, which simplifies to $k^b \bmod n$, then verifies $\text{hash}(k^b)$ matches $\text{hash}(x)$.
- If the parameters or group key are changed, all group members must be updated; however, a member can refresh u , v and certificates at any time.

Mu-Varadharajan (MV) identity scheme – setup I




- Mu-Varadharajan (MV) identity scheme is based on DSA principles.
- TA generates private parameters and server coefficient A .
 - TA generates n distinct primes s_1, \dots, s_n , their product q , prime $p = 2q + 1$ and generator g of p such that $g^q = 1 \pmod p$. These parameters are generated by a probabilistic algorithm such that p has approximately 500 significant bits. Note that the multiplicative group Z_q^* includes only those elements x where $\gcd(x, q) = 1$.
 - TA generates n roots x_1, \dots, x_n of the polynomial $p(x) = a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 + \dots + a_nx^n \pmod q$, then solves for a_0, \dots, a_n using a fast recursive algorithm.
 - TA computes functions $g_{ij}(a_i, x_j)$ ($i = 0, \dots, n; j = 1, \dots, n$) $\pmod p$ as the matrix G with i rows corresponding to coefficients a_i and j columns corresponding to roots x_j . By construction, the product of all elements of G is unity. The functions g_{ij} are described elsewhere.
 - Let S be the submatrix g_{ij} ($i = 0, \dots, n - 1; j = 1, \dots, n$); i. e., all but the last row, and C the vector g_{nj} ($j = 1, \dots, n$); i.e., only the last row. The server coefficient is A computed as the product of all elements of $S \pmod p$; this need be computed only once; S will not be used again.

Mu-Varadharajan (MV) identity scheme – setup II



- TA generates private server encryption and client decryption keys.
 - TA rolls private random group key b ($0 < b < q$) and computes its inverse $b^{-1} \bmod q$.
 - For each s_i , TA computes s'_i such that $s'_i s_i = s_i \bmod q$; i.e., $s'_i = (q + s_i) / s_i$. These are used as enabling keys to activate or revoke client decryption keys.
 - For each g_{nj} of C , TA generates corresponding $xbar_j = b^{-1} \sum x_i^n \bmod q$ ($i = 1, \dots, n, i \neq j$) and $xhat_j = s'_j x_j^n$. Each tuple $(p, xbar_j, xhat_j)$ ($j = 1, \dots, n$) is a private client decryption key for the b group and can be activated and revoked independently of each other. The j th key is distributed to each member of the j th client subgroup by secure means.
 - TA determines which client subgroups are to be enabled and computes the product s of the associated s_j . Then it computes the server private encryption key $E = A^s \bmod p$ and public decryption keys $gbar = g^s \bmod p$ and $ghat = g^{sb} \bmod p$. The tuple $(p, q, E, gbar, ghat)$ is distributed to the server group by secure means. All other data are private to the TA.

Mu-Varadharajan (MV) scheme



- TA generates MV parameters, group key, server key and client keys.
- TA transmits private encryption and public decryption keys to all servers using secure means.
- TA transmits individual private decryption keys to each client using secure means.
- TA can activate/deactivate individual client keys.
- The MV identity exchange is used to verify group membership.

Mu-Varadharajan (MV) identity scheme operations



- Client Alice verifies server Bob knows the secrets of the scheme identified with the b group and j subgroup.
 - Alice rolls random nonce r ($0 < r < q$) and sends to Bob.
 - Bob rolls random nonce k ($0 < k < q$) and computes $y = rE^k$, and public decryption keys $ybar = gbar^k$ and $yhat = ghat^k$, then sends (hash(y), $ybar$, $yhat$) to Alice.
 - Alice computes $F = ybar^{xhat} yhat^{xbar}$, which by construction is the inverse of E^k . She computes $x = rF^{-1}$, then verifies that hash(x) matches hash(y).
- As a practical consideration, this scheme is limited to n less than about 30 with p in the order of 500 significant bits. This is because the number of distinct primes s_j become harder to find as the number of significant bits of s_j diminish.

Key generation



- Key files are generated using the `ntp_keygen` utility.
 - Most files are generated and used on the same host; only the identity values need to be securely distributed in advance.
 - *hostname* is provided by the Unix `gethostname()` routine.
 - *filestamp* is the NTP seconds when the file was created.
 - All files are in PEM-encoded printable ASCII suitable as MIME extensions
- `ntpkey_key_hostname.filestamp`
 - Public/private encryption key
- `ntpkey_cert_hostname.filestamp`
 - X.509 version 3 certificate
- `ntpkey_sign_hostname.filestamp`
 - Public/private signature key; must agree with certificate key
- `ntpkey_scheme_hostname.filestamp`
 - Identification *scheme* IFF, GQ or MV

Key management



- Keyspace is relatively small, so keys must be refreshed frequently
 - Keys are refreshed automatically and without management intervention
 - Session key list is regenerated about once per hour
 - Server private cookie is regenerated about once per day
 - Public keys and certificates are regenerated by scripts about once per month
 - Autokey protocol automatically handles key refreshment and recovery
- Autokey protocol enforces partial ordering for file creation and use
 - NTP timestamp is appended to the name of every cryptographic data file
 - Filestamps accompany the data as it is moved from place to place
 - Certificate and certificate requests include filestamp as sequence number
 - Dependency graph is created for public keys, certificates and data dependent on them
 - By induction, the graph includes all cryptographic data in the network derived from the trusted primary servers at the root of the graph

Further information



- Network Time Protocol (NTP): <http://www.ntp.org/>
 - Current NTP Version 3 and 4 software and documentation
 - FAQ and links to other sources and interesting places
- David L. Mills: <http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills>
 - Papers, reports and memoranda in PostScript and PDF formats
 - Briefings in HTML, PostScript, PowerPoint and PDF formats
 - Collaboration resources hardware, software and documentation
 - Songs, photo galleries and after-dinner speech scripts
- FTP server [ftp.udel.edu \(pub/ntp directory\)](ftp://ftp.udel.edu/pub/ntp)
 - Current NTP Version 3 and 4 software and documentation repository
 - Collaboration resources repository
- Related project descriptions and briefings
 - See “Current Research Project Descriptions and Briefings” at <http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/status.htm>